VIII. 'NEW GEORGIA IS A PLEASANT PLACE, IF WE COULD BUT ENJOYE IT': FRONTIER AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT TO 1810

The area which would become the Russell Reservoir remained an obscure frontier throughout most of the Colonial Period. While both the Spanish and French made successful incursions into South Carolina and Georgia during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, their settlements focused on the coastal fringe, and explorations of the interior left behind little in the way of European culture. It was not until the English colonization of South Carolina (1670) and Georgia (1733) that roots were laid for a gradual population expansion into this frontier. The line of Anglo-American settlement slowly encroached upon the region during the latter decades of the Colonial Period, then moved more rapidly in the wake of the Revolutionary War and more aggressive policies toward the native population. The Revolutionary War period marks the beginning of RBR historical archaeology, with Beverly Bastian's excavations at Fort Independence providing our sole source of knowledge for the material world in the Frontier Period; her report (Bastian 1982) serves as the lynchpin of this chapter.

While settlement and the archaeology of the Frontier Period were limited, historical and ethnohistorical accounts provide for a schematic account of the region in the early years of Anglo-American occupation. Taylor and Smith (1978) and The History Group (1981) parallel each other in describing the region as a territorial limbo during both the protohistoric and frontier periods. Taylor and Smith (1978) suggest that the region served as a "buffer zone" during the protohistoric period, while The History Group (1981) argues that sparse early historic settlement was perhaps a result of a leap-frogging migration toward a rapidly expanding frontier. Their overviews set the tone for a consideration of life at Fort Independence and in the years immediately beyond.

THE PROTOHISTORIC OCCUPATION OF THE RUSSELL RESERVOIR

Taylor and Smith (1978) contend that the region which would be subsumed by the Russell Reservoir was only sparsely inhabited at the time of European contact. Considering the early historical accounts produced by Spanish and English explorers, they note a general paucity of references to aboriginal settlement in the project area. The 1540 exploration of Spanish conquistador Hernando De Soto, marking the earliest ethnohistoric account, appears to have crossed the general vicinity of the RBR; Hudson's (1985:34) reconstruction of De Soto's route shows it skirting the southern flank of the reservoir. Taylor and Smith (1978:113) note that after plundering the town of Cofitachique (a Sand Hills community located either near Silver Bluff on the South Carolina side of the Savannah River or, as is now thought, in the vicinity of Camden, South Carolina [Swanton 1922; Hudson 1976, n.d.; Baker 1974]), De Soto marched north towards the Appalachian mountains. He passed the province of Chalaque and the hamlet of Guaquili, apparently associated with Cofitachique, and then into definite Cherokee lands in the Appalachians. Hudson notes that the ease with which De Soto reached the Cherokees within the Blue Ridge suggests established trails and perhaps trading relations between the Cherokees and the Indians on the southeastern slope of the Appalachians. He also suggests that the ease with which the Spanish passed through the Cherokee nation might indicate that tribe was already weakened by European disease (Hudson 1976:112).

De Soto's account thus indicates a break in aboriginal settlement between the lower Piedmont, the area apparently under the dominion of Cofitachique, and the Cherokees of the Appalachians. The area appears to have been the boundary between separate socio-political entities. Subsequent exploration of the region followed a hiatus of over a century, but supports this settlement gap. In 1674 English explorer Henry Woodward visited a Westo Indian town on the lower Savannah river, where he learned that "Cowatoe and Chorakae Indians" lived in the headwaters of the Savannah River, i.e. within the Appalachians (Taylor and Smith 1978:113; Swanton 1922). Although he did not cross the project area, John Lawson (1972; in Taylor and Smith 1978:113) provided a similar account of aboriginal settlement in 1701, noting that the Cherokee were settled on the Savannah's headwaters. Both accounts suggest the Cherokee were concentrated in the Appalachians, and that aboriginal settlement to the south was not noteworthy. Colonel George Chicken, who visited the Cherokee in 1715 attempting to extinguish French efforts to instigate hostilities, mentioned no Cherokee towns below the Cherokee Lower Towns. Colonel Chicken passed immediately through the project area, and given the nature of his mission, the omission of any mention of Cherokee settlement in this area is noteworthy (Taylor and Smith 1978:113; Chicken 1916).

The naturalist William Bartram visited the project area twice during the close of the Colonial period. In 1773 he journeyed into north Georgia with the survey party which outlined the Cherokee and Creek cessions of that year. Traveling north from Augusta, Bartram noted in detail the ruins of a native American village and mound complex, which he felt "perhaps long preceded the discovery of this continent," yet made no reference to contemporary aboriginal settlements (Van Doren 1955:56). In fact, his only mention of human habitation in the area at this time was "a newly settled plantation" noted at the confluence of the Broad and Savannah Rivers (Van Doren 1955:63), south of the project area.

Bartram returned to the area in April and May of 1776. Journeying from Savannah up the Savannah River on his way to the Cherokee nation, he mentions passing Golphin's trading post, Fort Moore, and Augusta, before embarking into the frontier area known as "the New Purchase." From Augusta, Bartram travelled to Fort James, located at the confluence of the Broad and Savannah Rivers. While there he visited an aboriginal mound complex (apparently the Rembert Mound Group) again marveling at the social complexity and extensive construction of a vanished people, suggesting there was little evidence of more recent aboriginal occupation to attract his attention. From Fort James, Bartram crossed the Savannah River to the South Carolina side, and followed the "high road" toward Keowe. Eight or so miles up river (in the general area of the RBR) Bartram was surprised by a sudden storm, "attended with terrific thunder," which he fortunately passed at the shelter of a farmhouse. From this point he travelled another 35 miles or so, to the home of Mr. Cameron, deputy-commissioner of Indian affairs for the Cherokee. Bartram noted of his journey that the frequent storms "rendered travelling disagreeable, toilsome and hazardous, through an uninhabited wilderness, abounding with rivers and brooks" (Van Doren 1955:266-267).

The image projected by these historical accounts, that the project area occupied a territorial limbo between various Indian groups of the Piedmont and the Cherokee in the Appalachians, is supported by contemporary reconstructions of aboriginal settlement and socio-political boundaries. Swanton's (1922) map of Southeastern tribes shows no close associations of tribal names with the project area, and in particular no tribal associations for the eastern slope of the Appalachians. Mooney (1975:1-2) places the project area within the Cherokee nation, but notes that the principal Cherokee towns were found along the headwaters of the Savannah, Hiwasee, and Tuckasegee Rivers, and along the Little Tennessee River. Taylor and Smith (1978:114) contend that the Cherokee were involved in sustained hostilities with their neighboring tribes on each border, and suggest that "it appears from the low utilization of the project area at early historic times and the rampant early historic intertribal conflict, the project area may have served as a buffer zone between major tribes and/or tribal groupings such as the Creek Confederacy. Such a zone would be one to be crossed cautiously by relatively small hunting or raiding parties, but not a place to settle and build towns."

An alternative explanation, offered by Taylor and Smith (1978:114) and alluded to by Hudson (1976:112) suggests the aboriginal depopulation of the project area may have been the product of catastrophic epidemics of European diseases. As early as 1540, de Soto noted the effects of plague among the Indians, which probably originated through contact with de Ayllon's expedition of 1526. Adair reports that nearly half the Cherokee population was carried off by smallpox in 1738. Archaeological and historical sources indicate the prehistoric occupation within the RBR was substantial, and thus the depopulation during the protohistoric period was either related to changing socio-political organization following the Mississippian Period; epidemics spread through contact with Europeans; or a combination of the two. Taylor and Smith (1978:114) argue that the latter instance provides support for their buffer-zone hypothesis, since such a zone would not only reduce intertribal tension and conflict, but also limit the spread of disease from one population concentration to another. While an exact reconstruction of the causes of this population interstice cannot be drawn from either historical or archaeological data, both sources do support its existence.

EARLY HISTORICAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE RUSSELL RESERVOIR VICINITY

While the historical settlement of the RBR would derive from increasing population pressure, frontier expansion, and immigration from the north and south, the nature of the individuals likely to seek and settle the area was in part conditioned by the historical perception of its environment. Accounts such as Bartram's *Travels* were widely read both within America and abroad, and provided the images which prodded many settlers. The Russell Reservoir vicinity was not especially well reported in travel accounts or other sources, yet the historical views offered for the region area are an indication of its historical perception, and in turn a key to the types of persons who might seek out such lands.

Bartram's account provides the best description of the region as well as an assessment of its potential. Writing in 1773, Bartram noted that "After leaving Broad River, the land rises very sensibly, and the country being mountainous, our progress became daily more difficult and slow; yet the varied scenes of pyramidal hills, high forests, rich vales, serpentine rivers, and cataracts, fully compensated for our difficulties and delays." While commenting little on the flora at that time, Bartram did present a rather ferocious fauna in the area: "The dreaded and formidable rattlesnake is yet too common, and a variety of other serpents abound... The alligator, a species of crocodile, abounds in the rivers and swamps, near the sea coast, but is not seen above Augusta. Bears, tygers, wolves, and wild cats (felis cauda truncata) are numerous enough..." (Van Doren 1955:62-63). Thus at this early juncture, the project area was distinctly presented as something of a wilderness.

In his return of 1776, Bartram tempered this wilderness with its prospects for civilization. Writing of his journey to Fort James, to the south of the Russell Reservoir, Bartram noted (Van Doren 1955:263-264):

> the wild country now almost depopulated, vast forests, expansive plains and detached groves; then chains of gravelly, dry, barren summits present detached piles of rocks, which delude and flatter the hopes and expectations of the solitary traveller, full sure of hospitable habitations; heaps of white, gnawed bones of ancient buffalo, elk and deer, indiscriminately mixed with those of men, half grown over with moss, altogether, exhibit scenes of uncultivated nature, on reflection, perhaps, disagreeable to a mind of delicate feelings and sensibility, since some of these objects recognize past transactions and events, perhaps not altogether reconcileable to justice and humanity.

Despite its current inhospitable appearance, Bartram also recognized the bounty and potential of these new lands, especially as it passed into the possession of European colonists. He wrote (in The History Group 1981:66):

> This new ceded country promises plenty and felicity. The lands on the River are generally rich and those of its inumerable branches agreeable and healthy situations, especially for small farms, everywhere little mounts and hills to build on and beneath them rich level land fit for corn and any grain, with delightful glittering streams of running water through cain bottoms, proper for meadows, with abundance of water brooks for mills. The hills suit extremely well for vineyards and olives as nature points out by the abundant produce of fruitful grape vines, native mulberry trees of an excellent quality for silk. Any of this land would produce indigo and no country is more proper for the cultivation of almost all kinds of fruits.

Bartram's dialectic between wilderness and fruitful plain reflected the reality and ideal of the settlement of Georgia's frontier. While a prosperous plantation economy devoted primarily to the production of rice had developed along the coastal plain of Georgia and South Carolina, other crops required by Britain had not been grown with great success in the colonies. Indigo was produced in some quantities along the coast, yet Great Britain desired to see the successful production of wine and silk from the colonies. Thus the backcountry's role in the British economy was perceived as the producer of silk, as well as the bastion of Anglo-American white society. Writing to Lord Hillsborough in 1772, Governor James Habersham observed (in The History Group 1981:67; British Public Records Office, C. O. 5/661, p 116):

> If ever the Silk culture becomes a considerable branch of commerce here it must be done in the back country where the lands from their fertility and healthy situation can be profitably cultivated by, and admit a great number of white people without the assistance of negroes, which cannot be done for a considerable distance from the sea coast, where rice is the principal staple commodity, and the lands being flat and moist, and especially those that are proper for the cultivation of rice, on which stagnated water is sometimes necessarily kept, cause the white inhabitants in particular to be subject to severe automnal fevers, and consequently shortens their lives.

Georgia, like South Carolina, had witnessed a black majority by the close of the Revolutionary Period. While slavery had originally been prohibited in the colony, the financial successes achieved by the Carolina planters, coupled with the demands of Georgia's limited colonial population (and perhaps in particular the efforts of two esteemed communities: the German Salzburgers who settled the area of Ebenezer to the north of Savannah and the Puritans who settled the Midway community to Savannah's west) persuaded Georgia's colonial government to capitulate, and from 1750 onward slavery was permitted in the colony. The opening of the backcountry thus offered the possibility of redemption from the perceived threat of a black majority, and was touted as the bastion of white farmers. In civilizing this wilderness, these settlers were also hoped to provide a stabilizing influence on the colony.

Bartram's assessment was echoed by the surveyors of the New Purchase, who provided the following commentary on their map of the New Purchase lands (in The History Group 1981:67-68; British Public Records Office, M. P. G., p. 2):

> The Lands in General consist of Oak and Hickory in many Places intermixed with black walnut, Chestnut and Tupelo, especially in Vallies - level lands and cane brakes, the Hilly lands consisting of Oak and Hickory with some few pines; the Soil is of a Dark Chocolate colour from six to seven inches deep with gravel and a kind of red clay.... The soil in the Vallies is somewhat lighter in colour, very rich being intermixed with a fat marl, gravel and clay.... The soil on the level lands of which there are many fine spots, appears to be equally good with the Cane Swamps on the Savannah River below Augusta, on which grow large Tupelo and black walnut.... The Cane brakes which are extremely good the Soil being very deep and of a black hue.. The Soil on the Pine lands intermixed with a few oaks is of a light Grey Sand some places red commonly called molatto.... The poorest Pine land is Rocky and Soil consisting of gravel and grey sand, foundation yellow and red clay.... The whole of the Lands appear finely watered by abundance of Streams which are very convenient places for erecting Saw and Grist Mills. Also on the River Savannah are Several convenient places for Mills where Rocks and Islands in the River stand near Banks.

The environment described suited the type of settlement which had succeeded in the northeast: small farmsteads and cottage industry. It was a picture which was meant to entice settlers, and one which would especially appeal to southern farmers pushed out of the coastal plain by the plantation economy, as well as northerners searching for more fertile soils and industrial opportunities. Bartram's wilderness was intended for civilization by a pattern successfully established in New England and the Mid-Atlantic.

While these perceptions set the stage for our discussion of frontier settlement, it is insightful to step ahead for a moment and consider the response of one of these settlers. Edward Butler was a Virginian who journeyed to Georgia in search of better lands and opportunity. Finally settling in the area of Upton Creek, near present Thomson, Butler recorded his impressions of the new territory in prose and poetry. Like Bartram, Butler saw the problems and the promise of life in the New Purchase; like Bartram he saw the wilderness and the garden. Unlike Bartram, and other boosters of this land, Butler appears to have been less convinced as to which aspect of the dialect would prove dominant. In a poem written as he prepared to move his household from Virginia to Georgia, Butler recorded his thoughts and sentiments on his new home (in The History Group 1981:68-69; Edward Butler Diary, Special Collections, University of Georgia):

New Georgia is a pleasant place, If we could but enjoye it
Indians & Rogues they are so great, They almost have destroyd it.

All you that want to purchase wit[h], here you may buy aplenty
& let you[r] purse be Ere so full, You soon may have it Em[]ty

Their is one thing more attends this place, Which we do call an Evil
When we make Corn Wheat & Rice, Its eaten by the Weavel

Not only so we must work hard, & Take great Care to make it
So let us all with one accord, Conclude for to forsake it

Altho this province is so bad, You may rais heaps of cattle
They'l rais themselves without Expense, and that is half the battle

Here you may keep five hundred head, As Easy as keep Twenty
Here you may soon fill up your dish, When that it doeth get Empty

The flies in Sumer time they are so bad, They all most kill our creatures
they can not go into the swamps, for fear of the musqueators

They are best of[f] in winter time, They have no need of feeding
& I am sure in sumertime, They have no need of bleeding

Now to new Georgia I bid farewell, Hoping times may alter
Hoping all the worst of Rogues, Soon may get the halter

Could but the Indians be subdued, & Rogues could have their portion
Their could not be a better place, Athis side of the otion

Now I conclude & finish my song, I wish I was in Virginia
If I have said anything that's wrong, I am sure I'll forfit [illegible]

If I have sung anything that's wrong, I am shure I should be sorry
I have partly seen what I have [sung], & I have made my Song in a Horey

LAND CESSIONS PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION: FRONTIER SETTLEMENT IN THE RUSSELL RESERVOIR

The Russell Reservoir area must be considered as two frontiers, of Georgia and South Carolina respectively, since land cessions and settlement proceeded at a different pace on the opposing banks of the Savannah. The South Carolina side was settled at an earlier date than the Georgia territory, and by a somewhat different social and ethnic stock. By the late eighteenth century, this area lay at the end of a long arc of migration which originated in Pennsylvania, proceeded along the Shenandoah to the Appalachians, then south into the South Carolina Piedmont. This route was known as the Great Philadelphia wagon road. Once within the boundaries of South Carolina, the road ran from the Catawba Valley to Camden, then split in two, one fork continuing to Augusta, the other along an Indian trail to the community of Ninety Six, east of the Russell Reservoir. Ninety Six had begun as a frontier outpost of the Indian trade, and marked the terminus of the wagon road for settlers moving into the Russell Reservoir area (The History Group 1981:71-72).

In 1747 South Carolina negotiated a treaty with the Cherokees which provided for the cession of lands in the Long Canes Creek and Little River watershed in what is now southern Abbeville County. Initial European settlement was sparse, as conflicts between the Cherokees and settlers threatened the livelihood of this frontier, but following the Cherokee War of 1760-61 this area was secured as far north as the modern Abbeville-Anderson County line. The security of this region, coupled with the headright system of land grants enacted in 1763, propelled a wave of settlers into the region. Most originated from the northern colonies, and were of Germanic or Scots-Irish stock. While prior to 1761 there were reportedly only twenty-three white families in the entire South Carolina backcountry, the *South Carolina Gazette* of April 2, 1763 claimed that over 1,000 families had settled the region of Long Canes Creek in the previous year, and that another 400 families were currently en route from the northern colonies to settle this region. In order to formalize this settlement, and minimize the prospects for warfare between the settlers and the Cherokee, the British government negotiated an official boundary between Cherokee and British lands in South Carolina, the boundary drawn as a straight line between the Savannah and Reedy Rivers, a line followed by the present Abbeville-Anderson County line (Figure 73). With this act, settlement of the Abbeville County portion of the Russell Reservoir was secured for the Colonial Period (The History Group 1981:72; Simms 1860:120; DeVorsey 1966).

The statistics cited by the *South Carolina Gazette* not withstanding, the settlement of the Russell Reservoir portion of this frontier appears to have been limited. The 1773 map of Indian lands and boundaries (Figure 73) indicates only three settlers in the area: two Pickens and a Langd. The archaeological evidence also supports a sparse population in the years prior to the Revolutionary War, with only two sites identified which possessed ca. 1760s components (Brooks 1978:116-117). In his official report on the South Carolina-Cherokee boundary of 1766, deputy Indian superintendent Alexander Cameron noted: "I could not learn that we took in any land, that had been surveyed by any White man before; but there is one Atkins, settled within four miles of the Line, near to Savannah" (Bastian 1982:14; DeVorsey 1966:132). Given that the opposite bank of the Savannah remained Creek territory until 1773, it is likely that settlers avoided any close proximity with the Savannah for fear of an outbreak of Indian hostilities, such as occurred in 1764 when the Creeks massacred several families in the Long Canes Creek vicinity (Bastian 1982:14; Davis 1949:5). Thus the project area remained a frontier in a very real sense of the word.

In Georgia, the line of the frontier was expanded by a series of treaties. The 1763 Treaty signed between the Creeks and the British at Augusta, established the



Eflator
Toxaway
Aconnee
Quacoretche
Chicherohe
Sugar Town
Fort Prince George
New Keowee
Old Keowee
Tugeloo Mountain
Echay
R O K E E S
Noyowee
Eflatohe
Tugoola
Takwafhuaw
Sennekaw
Chagee
Tufsee
Cherokee or Broad River calld also Suhagee River which parts the Cherokee and Creek Lands
Fort Charlott
Pickens
Langd
C R E E K S
Little River which parts the Creeks and Georgia

Source: The History Group 1981:64.

Figure 73. 1773 Map of the Project Area. Note Fort Charlotte and the presence of a Pickens and Langd in the reservoir area.

boundaries which the Creeks agreed not to penetrate (Brooks 1978:117; M'Call 1909:207-209):

> This treaty concluded on the 10th of November 1763; and it was agreed that a farther acquisition of territory should be annexed to Georgia; the boundary to be settled by a line extending up Savannah and Little rivers, to the fork of the latter; thence to the head spring or source of the Ogecee river, and down said river to Mount Pleasant; thence a line to be run direct to Saint-Savilla on the Altamaha river; and thence in a direct line to the extremity of the tide water on the river St. Mary's.

A second treaty between the Creeks, Cherokee, and British was made in 1773; this treaty extended the boundaries of Georgia into the project area. William Bartram journeyed with the survey party which marked the boundaries of this treaty, recording (in Brooks 1978:117; Bartram 1943:140):

> I returned to camp at the great lick, where I found our people and the indians in a wharm contraversy concerning the direction of the Lines of Lands to be marked out[;] however, by the address & wise conduct of Coll. Barnet, the dispute was soon decided to the seeming satisfaction of both parties & the Corner Tree was pitch'd on, from whence the Surveyors took their courses. Here our company divided [.] A party of Surveyors with the Creek Indians run the line down the so: side of Ogeche a certain distance [,] thence another course to the river Altamaha; the Coll... his surveyors. with the party of Cherokees [,] continued up the Ridge to the mark't tree of the old Line, thence a No: course, to Savannah River a mile below the mouth of Tugilo, where the River divides and loses its name [,] both heading in the Cherokee mountains.

Brooks (1978:118) notes that five archaeological sites recorded on the Georgia side of the river may date to this (pre-1773) period.

While the land cessions on the Georgia side of the river appeared to provide a more secure boundary for the frontier settlement, this security was illusionary. By 1775, the growing hostilities between the British, Americans, Cherokees and Creeks threatened the stability and safety of the Russell Reservoir settlement.

THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR IN THE AREA OF THE RUSSELL RESERVOIR: PRELUDE TO FORT INDEPENDENCE

The Revolutionary War in South Carolina can be said to have begun in the backcountry. The first overt act of the war occurred at Fort Charlotte, south of the project area, on July 12, 1775. On that date a company of South Carolina Rangers, under orders of the newly formed Council of Safety, seized the fort's arms and stores (Bastian 1982:10; Davis 1949:12-14). The backcountry also witnessed the first patriot casualty in the entire south. A dispute between Whigs and Tories at Ninety Six, in November of 1775, resulted in the Whigs being besieged behind a hastily erected stockade. The siege lasted several days; one Whig was killed, and twelve wounded, in the confrontation (Bastian 1982:10; Landrum 1897:325; Davis 1949:13). Loosely organized and sporadic confrontations between local Whigs and Tories typified much of the military activity of the backcountry, as this region in particular was divided in its sentiments regarding the revolution. The War in the backcountry was also characterized by considerable hostilities between the Whigs, Creeks and Cherokees.

With the Declaration of Independence and the drafting of the Continental forces, the military activities assumed a more organized nature. The Cherokee responded to the War quickly, attacking settlements in Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia. These four colonies responded in kind. In July, 1776, the Ninety Six militia, under the direction of Andrew Williamson, marched against the Cherokee in response to attacks following the British assault on Charleston. Williamson's goal was to destroy both villages and food supplies, and thus cripple the Cherokee's efforts to aid the British. An advance base was established at the subdued Cherokee town of Seneca, the fortification, completed in August of 1776, being known as Fort Rutledge. From this point Williamson coordinated with North Carolina troops, and was successful in harassing the Cherokees. The Cherokee sued for peace shortly, and in May of 1777 South Carolina and Georgia concluded a treaty which pushed back the boundaries of the Cherokee nation. Most of the area of Greenville, Pickens, Oconee and Anderson counties was acquired by this treaty, with European settlement following quickly. Thus by 1777 the entire area of the Russell Reservoir was in European control (Bastian 1982:10; Brooks 1978:119-120).

The period of 1774-1776 witnessed the construction of a line of fortifications along the Savannah, to protect against Creek, Cherokee, and British attacks. The Savannah had been perceived as a line of defense a decade earlier, when Fort Charlotte was erected at the confluence of the Broad and Savannah rivers in response to the Creek attack at Long Canes in 1764. Additional hostilities between the Creeks and settlers had led to the construction of twelve stockaded forts between the Savannah and Reedy rivers in early 1774 (Bastian 1982:14; *South Carolina Gazette*, February 21, 1774). Among these may have been Fort Royal, a fortification apparently within the Russell Reservoir which could not be located during the archaeological studies. Fort Royal was described as "being about eighteen miles above Fort Charlotte on Savannah-river, on the frontiers of this colony" (The History Group 1981:168; Hemphill and Wates 1960:255). As it was in existence in 1776, and one of the fortifications inspected by a delegation from the Continental Congress in that year, Fort Royal was probably constructed during the 1774 confrontations. While the form of the fortification is unknown, the report of Lieutenant Governor Bull on the defense of this frontier is enlightening. Bull wrote that he was sending "powder and ball" to the "Poorest of the Irish, French, and German... new-comers"; ordering the militia to patrol the banks of the Savannah; and encouraging the settlers in the "building of stockade forts in New Bordeau and other most convenient places" (The History Group 1981:172; *Records* *of the British Public Records Office Relating to South Carolina*, 1774:34:8). Thus this early line of fortifications probably consisted of no more than stockaded farmsteads constructed by the settlers themselves, and located at convenient points for their mutual defense of the region.

In his 1833 Revolutionary War pension application, William Gabriel Pickens (brother of Andrew Pickens) recounted (in Brooks 1978:118; Sharpe 1963:143):

> About the 2nd of July [1775] preceding my entering the service, the inhabitants along the frontiers and back settlements of Georgia and the Carolinas, had generally forted up, in consequence of the Cherokee Indians, who were extremely troublesome at this time; having been instigated by the British. To protect themselves from indian warfare, and to defend the country as much as possible, the frontier inhabitants had constructed a line of forts along the Savannah River and had mustered themselves into companies, stationed principally at these forts. As soon as I joined the service [October 1776], which was to aid in guarding the frontiers and in repelling the indians, Captain Anderson stationed himself at one of these forts called Fort Independence, situated on the Savannah River, where we remained fourteen months in constant service against these Indians -- in scouring the country and protecting inhabitants.

The location and construction dates of all of these forts is unknown, with both 1774 and 1776 referenced as periods of military construction. Bastian's work at Fort Independence (discussed in detail below), however, supports the interpretations of Fort Royal presented above, and suggests that many of these "forts" may have been no more than fortified homesteads originally established in 1774 and perhaps reinforced in 1776.

The war in the backcountry thus took on a dual nature at an early juncture. While participating in the fight against the British (although frequently somewhat far afield from the Ninety Six District), the war also offered an opportunity to organize and repel the Cherokees and Creeks from the region, who had long been perceived as a threat to settlement.

The years of 1777 and 1778 passed within the region without much conflict. The Ninety Six militia maintained surveillance of the region, as there were sporadic rumors of Creek uprisings, but most of its true military activity was played out on distant fields, with both Andrew Pickens and Andrew Williamson assisting General Howe in the aborted attempt to retake St. Augustine, Florida.

In 1779 the War entered the backcountry. Colonel William Boyd, a prominent Spartanburg Tory, traveled with 700 South Carolina Loyalists across the backcountry, attempting to link with the British forces occupying Augusta. Colonel Andrew Pickens and 400 South Carolina and Georgia militiamen were in the area, attempting to counter a small British contingent who were trying to persuade the backcountry settlers to cease their resistance to British control. Upon hearing of Boyd's troop movements, Pickens abandoned his cause and went in pursuit of Boyd. Boyd was attacked first at Cherokee Ford by a party of Ninety Six militiamen under the command of Captain Robert Anderson, but Boyd easily repulsed this smaller force and successfully crossed into Georgia. On February 14th, however, Boyds' troops were engaged at Kettle Creek by Pickens' forces. Boyd was mortally wounded in battle, and his demoralized troops either surrendered or retreated in disarray. The Battle of Kettle Creek halted British efforts at securing an alliance with the backcountry settlers, (Waring 1962:27, in Bastian 1982:11):

> which was the only check on the British advance in Georgia, broke the spirit of the Tories and secured peace for a time in the interior of the Carolinas and Georgia. Some years later, Pickens himself said he believed 'it was the severest check and chastisement the Tories ever received in South Carolina or Georgia'.

The Ninety Six militia was occupied with more distant battles for the remainder of 1779. In June they covered the retreat of General Benjamin Lincoln's troops at the battle of Stono Ferry near Charleston, and in September and October of 1780 they joined Lincoln's futile storming of Savannah. With the fall of Charleston in May of that year, the British considered Georgia and South Carolina to be conquered territories, and Whigs in the upcountry were paroled to return home in a hopefully peaceful relation with their Tory neighbors (Bastian 1982:11):

> The ensuing period was one of travail and humiliation for the Patriots. Continuing Tory abuse and atrocity were largely ignored by the British occupation officials. But the Whig spirit persisted and broke free again in 1781, when the British and Tory oppression could no longer be tolerated.

Colonel Andrew Pickens and the Ninety Six militiamen rejected their paroles in late 1780, and immediately aided the war effort at the crucial Battle of Cowpens, South Carolina. Here the militia and Continental forces were successful in defeating the British. Other decisive battles of the years 1781 and '82 included: Guilford Courthouse (North Carolina), on March 15, 1781; the siege of Augusta in early May of that year; the Siege of Ninety Six in May and June of 1781; and the Battle of Eutaw Springs (South Carolina) in September. In December of 1782 the British abandoned Charleston, and the War in South Carolina and Georgia was over.

It was a devastating war for the backcountry, as much a civil war as a Revolution, pitting family against family and brother against brother. Nowhere else had sentiments been so evenly divided, nor had the war taken such a toll. In its wake, the Revolutionary War in the backcountry left behind 1,400 widows and orphans (Bastian 1982:12; Bass 1978:422).

FORT INDEPENDENCE

The overview of the Revolutionary War in the backcountry, as presented above, provides a broad panorama of history at the time. Yet history is more than a tapestry in which the major events are played out against a muted background. History is also somewhat of a patchwork quilt, a series of places, pieces, and episodes whose connecting borders form meaningful patterns. To this point in its history, the Russell Reservoir must be understood in terms of major events; there are no detailed studies of its pre-revolutionary inhabitants. With the Revolutionary War, the particular history of the region becomes available. Fort Independence represents our Revolutionary War era patch.

Fort Independence is a good example of how this particularistic history can contribute to the understanding of larger events. The site has no particular significance within the war, and was not the location of any decisive battle or great military feat. Within the region its historical importance is overshadowed by the activities at Forts Charlotte and Rutledge, and at an unnamed and unknown stronghouse at Cherokee Ford. Anomalous in history, Fort Independence also fails to conform to models of frontier and military existence proposed by archaeology. Yet Fort Independence does speak to the larger events of the time. As Principal Investigator Robert Newman reminds us in his foreward to Bastian's (1982:ii) report:

> The reason that Fort Independence fails to fit many of the accepted concepts is clear: Fort Independence was strongly influenced by a unique set of historical events that significantly shaped the archaeological record. While Fort Independence is an extreme example, all historic sites have their unique histories and these should play a stronger role in site specific research and the development of explanatory models.

A Chronology of Fort Independence

While the date of Fort Independence's abandonment and destruction are explicitly revealed in the documentary record, the origin of the fort is less certain. Bastian's (1982) archaeological excavations revealed that the fort was in fact a fortified homesite, consisting of a stockaded house and semi-subterranean soldiers' huts beyond the stockade walls. This observation was critical to reconstructing the history of Fort Independence, since it is unlikely that such a compound would have been constructed solely for military purposes. As Bastian (1982) observes, the homesite most likely existed first, the fortifications, and the military nomenclature of "Fort Independence," coming at a later date.

The fort was constructed by, and on the lands of, Robert Anderson. Anderson initially patented lands on Rocky Creek in 1767, acquiring 150 acres at that time (Bastian 1982:13; *Colonial Plats*, Vol. 15:312). In July, 1774, an additional 150 acres on Rocky Creek were acquired by Anderson (Bastian 1982:13; *Colonial Land Grants*, Vol. 31:447) while in December of that year he submitted a memorial for yet another 150 acres on Great Rocky Creek (Bastian 1982:13; *Memorials*, Vol. 13:154). It is uncertain which of these plats contained the Fort Independence tract, although this information does bracket Anderson's recorded land acquisitions on Rocky Creek to the period between 1767 and 1774.

The nucleus of Fort Independence, and indeed a stockaded homestead, could have been constructed in 1774. Several historical references indicate a line of fortifications were erected in that year to defend against Creek attacks on the frontier. As noted above, the *South Carolina Gazette* of February 21, 1774, mentions a line of twelve stockaded forts between the Savannah and Reedy rivers. Another reference, correspondence from Major Andrew Williamson to Captain John Bowie, commandant of Fort Charlotte, supports an existing line of fortifications by 1776, Williamson writing on July 3rd of that year that his militia was eager to engage the Indians, with the exception of "some of your nearest neighbors who are patching up old fforts" (Bastian 1982:15; *Bowie Papers*, Document 10).

However, other references suggest that Fort Independence was erected *in toto* in 1776. The pension application of William Pickens (cousin of the William Gabriel Pickens cited above) states that in 1776 "this applicant together with many families was compelled to erect a fort for their safety and defence called Fort Independence" (Bastian 1982:14; Sharpe 1963:142).

While the archaeological evidence failed to provide definitive answers as to the construction date of the fortification, it did suggest that the central structure within the stockade was constructed as a homesite at some time prior to the advent of military hostilities. The stockade itself most likely followed in 1774, and was perhaps refurbished in 1776, thus answering William Pickens testimony of a 1776 construction date. It should also be remembered that Robert Anderson was the architect of a true military fortification, Fort Rutledge, built at Seneca during the Cherokee War of 1776, and it is unlikely that he would have built the simple stockaded homesite found at Fort Independence had construction been entirely engaged in 1776 (Bastian 1982:15). Homesite, probably stockaded in 1774, and then refurbished and dubbed Fort Independence at the advent of the Revolutionary War, appears to offer the most plausible reconstruction of events.

Fort Independence served various militia functions in its inaugural year. In 1777 the governor and legislature of South Carolina took more formal steps to control the frontier, and detatched three companies from the 5th Continental Regiment of South Carolina and assigned them as independents to assist the militia in the backcountry. Captain Benjamin Tutt's company was assigned to Fort Rutledge (Bastian 1982:16; *Tutt Account*, 1824 deposition of Thomas Farrar; *Tutt Account*, 1824 deposition of Robert Looney); the assignment of troops under Captain John Moore is unknown; while Captain John Bowie's company was assigned to Fort Independence. Bowie's first surviving communication while in command of Fort Independence was received by him on November 13, 1777, suggesting he was not in residence until the latter part of that year.

In late 1778, General Andrew Williamson wrote Bowie regarding various business matters, and referenced a proposal Bowie had made at an earlier date to build a new fort elsewhere. Williamson noted that such an undertaking could not be engaged immediately, but that it would be considered. At the end of 1778 Williamson wrote Bowie as follows (Bastian 1982:17; *Bowie Papers*, Document 50):

> White Hall
> Decembr 31st 1778
>
> Dear Sir:
>
> As I understand it is the General Opinion of the Inhabitants, as well as your own that plan[t]ing the Garrison now kept up at Fort Independence, on some spot near the old Boundary line, on or near the banks of Savannah River would tend more effectually to secure the frontier Inhabitants of this State. I desire you will as speedily as Possible look out the proper place Whereon to erect a fort agreeable to the plan you furnished me with Yesterday - you will get the soldiers belonging to your company to do the Work, for which I will see them paid according to the agreement you make with 'em, and have wrote Cap.t Moore to immediately put himself and Company under your command, and assist all in his power to effect this Business as quickly as Possible. I have also wrote to Cap.t Robt Anderson, Whose abilities in such Matters is Well known and requested him to assist you in the Choice of Ground, and also to Carry on the Work for Which I Will see him paid - as Colo Pickens has the direction and arranging the troops who do the line duty, you will before you send Cap.t Moore's letter to acquaint him, and also take his orders when occasion makes it necessary.
>
> I am Dear Sir
> Your Mo Hble Servant,
> A. Wmson

Thus, with little more than a year's time spent at Fort Independence, plans were made to reconstruct the fort at a more advantageous position. While not mentioned as a factor in Williamson's December 31st letter, it is possible that the humble stockaded homesite was insufficient to serve Bowie's garrison, and the speed with which the construction of a new fortification was proposed suggests Bowie might have been concerned about the possibility of an attack. No mention is made of preserving the original Fort Independence as a military post, again supporting an interpretation that it was poorly suited to war-time activity.

Fort Independence appears to have been abandoned quickly. In mid-February 1779, Colonel William Boyd's Loyalist forces burnt the original Fort Independence on their journey to Augusta (Bastian 1982:18; Waring 1962:25). The whereabouts of Bowie's troops during Boyd's crossing is unknown, and Boyd was opposed only by a small force of militiamen led by Captain Robert Anderson at Cherokee Ford and Van's Creek, before being routed at Kettle Creek by Andrew Picken's troops. Clearly Bowie's men had abandoned Fort Independence by this time, or some mention would have been made of a military encounter. Subsequent references to Fort Independence in the Bowie Papers indicate that it was an ongoing entity in the years after 1779, most likely at some new location selected on the Savannah, as Bowie had proposed. The last reference to Fort Independence, January 22, 1780, is included in a discussion of supplies needed for the reinforcement of Augusta, in which General Williamson instructed then Major Bowie to "send down all the articles for the building or repg [repairing] the fort" (Bastian 1982:20; *Bowie Papers*, Document 59). The reference suggests that the new Fort Independence had only recently been completed, not a surprising reference, since Ivers notes that few South Carolina forts were built within a year (Bastian 1982:21; Ivers 1970:30).

Of the original Fort Independence, the tract containing its remains was sold by South Carolina following the war to a John Vanderhorst, who procured the land on December 8, 1793, described in the deed as "formerly the property of Robert Anderson and known by the name of Fort Independence" (Bastian 1982:21). Of the second Fort Independence, no mention of its disposition was recovered, and its location remains unknown.

Military Life at Fort Independence: Aspects from the Documentary Record

The Bowie Papers contain comments on certain aspects of military life at Fort Independence: subsistence and supplies, political intrigue, and the relations between Bowie and his fellow officers. The papers do not document the day-to-day occurrences of military life: drill and patrol, which is not surprising considering these communications generally conveyed instructions and information of interest to the Fort Independence garrison. The documentary record does provide certain particulars useful for an understanding of life at Fort Independence.

Supplies generally came to Fort Independence by wagon from either Ninety Six or White Hall, although on instances it was necessary for the commandants to journey to Ninety Six or White Hall and have their supplies allotted to them. Captain Bowie was sometimes thrown back on his own resources for providing sustenance, particularly so with cattle. It is clear that no attempts were made at either herding or farming at Fort Independence, and that the fortification was by no means self-sufficient. Frequently mentioned supplies sent to Fort Independence included meat, either in barrels of salt beef or as live cattle, flour, sides of arms (muskets with bayonets), and cash money. Other supplies mentioned in the correspondence included shelled and ground corn, buttons, a cask of rye (not specified as to grain or whiskey), shoes, clothing, sealing wax, rum, hemp, and sugar. On occasion General Williamson requested supplies from the stores at Fort Independence: 14 panes of glass, arms, clothing, and hardware for military construction (Bastian 1982:23).

Political events mentioned in the Bowie Papers include an election scheduled to take place in late 1778. In November of that year, General Williamson wrote Bowie regarding the election of Whig Assemblymen from the Ninety Six District. Several Whigs were opposing the incumbent assemblymen, on the grounds that the incumbents, all officers, would be inclined to favor continuing the war rather than suing for peace. Williamson sent Bowie a list of desirable candidates, comprised primarily of officers of the Ninety Six militia, and including Williamson himself, and suggested that Bowie "countenance [it] wt your interest." Williamson also advised Bowie to send his men who were eligible to vote early, so they could help defeat this scheme, with the implication that they be advised to vote appropriately (Bastian 1982:23; *Bowie Papers*, Document 69).

Although no statistics are given in this correspondence regarding the population of Fort Independence, estimates can be produced on the basis of other Revolutionary War militia companies. For example, each company of the North Carolina militia consisted of 50 rank and file (minimally), two sergeants, two corporals, one drummer, one fifer, and three commissioned officers: a captain, a lieutenant, and an ensign (Bastian 1982:24; Gobbel 1919:52). Thus a company would consist of at least 59 men. While Bowie's company was independent and not militia, it presumably possessed a similar contingent. Thus, if staffed at full force, Fort Independence sheltered 59 individuals for the duration of its existence, and possibly twice that number for a month or two in late 1778, when Moore's troops were placed under Bowie's command. If these companies were at full strength, then Fort Independence would have been badly over-crowded. However, Revolutionary War companies rarely achieved full strength due to desertions, resignations, and personal leaves, and Bastian (1982:24) estimates that perhaps 40 individuals, give or take 10, were stationed at the Fort, with the majority living outside the stockade walls.

The Bowie Papers also provide some clues to the command structure of the military in the backcountry, and Bowie's and Fort Independence's relation to other commandants and outposts. Captains Bowie, Tutt, and Moore headed three independent companies in the backcountry. Their orders were received from General Andrew Williamson, head of the Ninety Six militia, or through his aide-de-camp Malcolm Brown. Bowie and Tutt appear to have been on equal ground, neither receiving precedence in transmitting or receiving orders, whereas Moore sometimes received his orders through Bowie, a possible indication that he occupied a lower station. Both Tutt and Bowie had permanent assignments, Fort Rutledge and Fort Independence respectively, whereas Moore appears to have traveled about. Bowie's and Moore's companies sometimes acted in conjunction, whereas Tutt always remained near Fort Rutledge, and when acting in conjunction, Bowie assumed command. Both Bowie and Tutt provided support for militia activities, including men, supplies, military expertise, and musicians for military functions. Both actively recruited new enlistments, although Bowie also requested, on at least one occasion, five additional men from Ninety Six, a request granted by General Williamson. Most of the action Bowie's troops saw was in conjunction with Picken's militia, although Bowie himself was wounded at the battle of Stono Ferry, and if his company was also present, then this was at least one instance when they participated with the regular Continental forces (Bastian 1982:24-25).

Other military actions engaged by Bowie's men included guard duty for prisoners (apparently Tory sympathizers) held at the Ninety Six jail, and providing defense for farmers of the backcountry during harvest. While their routine was generally uneventful, Bowie's independents appear to have traveled further and participated in more memorable battles toward the close of the war, as their possible presence at Stono Ferry and at the storming of Savannah (Bowie was there, as well as Tutt's independents, suggesting Bowie's independents participated in the battle as well) indicates (Bastian 1982:26).

The Structure and Construction of Fort Independence

Bastian's (1982) archaeological excavations at Fort Independence combined machine and hand excavations to delimit the extent of the fortification during the testing phase, and primarily employed hand excavations for the investigation of identified archaeological features during data recovery. The machine work consisted of a series of twenty-one backhoe excavated test trenches, spaced on six meter intervals, and excavated to subsoil (Bastian 1982:28). These were extremely successful at defining the limits of the palisade; Figure 74 shows the extent of machine and hand excavations advanced during the testing phase, as well as identified archaeological resources. While this strategy appears to be well suited for the recovery of monumental architecture, Bastian (1982:34) notes that backhoe excavations were less successful during the data recovery phase, when arid soil conditions prevented a clean exposure of the subsoil surface. The utility of this technique should thus be considered in conjunction with soil conditions and climate.

The testing phase investigations identified a series of archaeological remains associated with Fort Independence. These included: (1) a three bastioned stockade enclosing two structures; (2) an apparent earlier homesite within the stockade, built on a stone foundation, which probably served as Bowie's residence and command headquarters; (3) a second structure within the stockade, built with posts, adjacent to the northwest bastion; and (4) an apparent semi-subterranean soldier's hut located outside the stockade at its southwest corner, which apparently served as an entrance. Each of these is discussed below.

The Stockade The Stockade at Fort Independence measured 76 feet (26.2 m) on each curtain wall, and featured bastions on the northeast, northwest, and southeast corners. The northeast bastion was somewhat larger than those on the northwest and southeast, as the figures in Table 6 indicate (Bastian 1982:63, 65). The fort encompassed some 5,776 square feet, excluding the bastions, with approximately 453.25 square feet consumed by the stone foundationed homesite (Bastian 1982:138), and perhaps an additional 200 square feet devoted to the structure adjacent to the northwest bastion. Thus approximately 5,123 square feet beyond these structures were available for shelter during an attack. This space would have sheltered a reasonably large population during hostilities, although it


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E 102
E 108
E 114
E 120
E 126
N 30
N 20
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S 10
S 20
S 30
FORT INDEPENDENCE
38 AB 218
0 5 10 20 METERS
0 25 50 FEET
GN
N
22°
OUTLINE OF STOCKADE
HAND EXCAVATED AREA
GRANITIC & QUARTZ FIELDSTONE FOUNDATIONS OF CENTRAL STRUCTURE
BACKHOE TRANSECTS & EXTENT OF BACKHOE STRIPPED AREA
INTERPRETIVE LINE
ROCK CONCENTRATION
SPRING AREA

Source: Bastian 1983:29.

Figure 74. Plan of Stockade, Interior Features, and Excavations at Fort Independence.

would have proved cramped if occupied on a full-time basis by a company of 40 to 60 individuals. Bastian (1982:62) suggests that most of the troops probably lived outside the compound.

Table 6: Dimensions of bastions recorded at Fort Independence (from Bastian 1982:63)

Bastion	Length * North Flank	Length * North Face	Length * South Flank	Length * South Face	Length * Of Gorge
Northeast	3.25 m (10' 8")	3.71 m (12' 2")	3.20 m (10' 6")	3.76 m (12' 4")	2.39 m (7' 10")
Northwest	2.59 m (8' 6")	2.82 m (9' 3")	2.59 m (8' 6")	2.79 m (9' 2")	2.4 m (7' 10.5")
Southeast	2.74 m (9')	2.74 m (9')	2.54 m (8' 4")	2.82 m (9' 3")	2.43 m (8')

* Measured between midpoints of postmolds

The stockade was constructed of large posts on approximately 5 m (16.5 ft) spacings. A total of 29 such posts were used in the construction (Bastian 1982:65; Figure 75), with three posts placed on each curtain wall, five forming each bastion, and an additional two posts framing the entrance to the fort at the southwest corner. These posts measured from 24 to 50 cm (31.5 to 47.25 in) in diameter, and were generally buried 60.7 cm (23.87 in) within the subsoil. The posts themselves were probably trimmed trees, and Bastian (1982:67) hypothesizes that the spacing between posts was probably bridged by cross pieces to which smaller trimmed trees (or possibly planks) were nailed. If smaller trimmed trees were employed, the fort would appear to consist of a true palisade of posts, but in actuality would be less durable, since spaces between the main posts could be easily breached. It is uncertain whether this construction was a deliberate attempt to create the illusion of a more securely constructed palisaded fort, or simply a matter of expediency and/or limited man power, but in either instance it was probably less than ideal for military purposes. All but two of the excavated postholes yielded charcoal or charred post remains within the fill, supporting the documented burning of this fortification by Colonel William Boyd's troops Bastian 1982:65).

The Homesite Located in the center of the stockade and on the crest of the knoll on which the fort was built, the homesite consisted of several features built with an unmortared granitic and quartz fieldstone masonry: a fireplace foundation, an adjacent cellar hole with entrance, and sections of a continuous foundation. The dimensions of this structure, as interpreted from the intact sections of stone foundation, measured approximately 26' 6" (8.08 m) east-west by 20' 6" (6.25 m)


F 35
F 34
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N 20 E 60
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ST 1 PM B
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PM 6
F 3
F 22
PM 4
ST 1 PM D
ST 1 PM C
ST 1 PM E
ST 1 PM A
F 23
N 10 E 60
F 4
F 10
F 1
F 5
F 24
STRUCTURE 2
F 47
N 0 E 60
F 25
F 6
F 7
F 26
F 27
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F 30
F 31
F 32
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S 10 E 60
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S 20 E 60
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METERS
FEET
0
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60
S 50 E 50
HAND EXCAVATED AREA
BACKHOE EXCAVATED AREA
SPRING AREA
F 49
S 55.6 E 24
S 55 E 30
S 55 E 40
S 55 E 50

Source: Bastian 1982:30.

Figure 75. Archaeological Features Within Fort Independence.

north-south. The average width of this wall was 1' 8.5" (.052 m). The surviving foundation sections included the southwest corner of the structure and part of the north wall. These had apparently been constructed in a very shallow builder's trench, and consisted of large interlocking stones with smaller stone fragments employed as chinking. There was no indication that these stones were mortared, and the missing sections of the foundation were presumably robbed for reuse at a later date, or possibly cleared for agricultural purposes (Bastian 1982:44). Documentary references to a loft indicate that the structure was at least one and a half stories tall (Bastian 1982:56; *Bowie Papers*, Document 15).

The fireplace was constructed within an excavated pit, with the foundation abutting the walls of this excavation on three sides. As with the house and cellar foundations, construction consisted of large inter-locking field stones with stone chinking. In dimensions the fireplace foundation measured 12' (3.66 m) in length and ranged from 6' to 6' 6" (1.83 to 1.98 m) in width. The average width of the stonework was 1' 10" (0.56 m), with the height of the surviving stonework measured at 2' 3.5" (0.70 m) (Bastian 1982:43).

The cellar exhibited a continuous stone facade interrupted only at the southeast corner, where a gap provided for an outside entry. The occasional gaps between the exterior walls of the excavated cellar hole and the cellar masonry itself were filled with yellow clay. This use of prepared clay would have helped bond the cellar foundation to the walls of the excavation, as well as seal gaps and prevent water leakage into the cellar. The dimensions of the cellar were 20' 6" (6.25 m) north-south and 14' 7" (4.45 m) east-west, while the tallest surviving section of the wall was 4' 0.75" (1.24 m). The average width of the cellar wall was 1' 5.5" (0.44 m) (Bastian 1982:43-44).

Following its destruction by Colonel William Boyd's troops, Fort Independence was apparently policed, and the cellar hole filled with debris from the burnt fortification: burnt wood, stone, and some artifactual debris from within the structure and from the surrounding yard. It is difficult to determine why this was done, or by whom, although Bastian (1982:51) notes that the absence of water-laid deposits or weathering within the cellar fill suggest it was backfilled shortly after the fort was destroyed. Bastian (1982:51) feels that Bowie's troops were the most likely to have backfilled the cellar, perhaps during a return to the fortification to scavenge nails and other hardware for the construction of the new Fort Independence. It is also possible that the fort was backfilled by Captain Robert Anderson's troops, shortly after their battle with Boyd's forces. Anderson would likely have visited the site of Fort Independence, his earlier homestead, to determine how it had been treated by Boyd, and he may have wished to salvage materials and police the area. Finally, it is possible that the cellar was backfilled by Boyd's troops to prevent its use as a defensive location at some later date. While the motive is uncertain, the archaeological research indicates a deliberate filling of the cellar shortly after the fort was destroyed.

The Structure Adjacent to the Northwest Bastion During the testing phase excavations at Fort Independence, Bastian identified a second structure located within the stockade. This structure was situated adjacent to the northwest bastion, and located just outside its entrance. Identified by the presence of nine postmolds, these did not outline an easily recognizable structure type (Figure 75). Two postmolds (designated ST1 PMA and PMB respectively) apparently formed an entrance on a north-south axis immediately behind the bastion entrance. A second pair of posts (PMC and PMD) formed some type of partition wall approximately 8' 3" (2.5 m) within the entrance formed by postmolds A and B, while a fifth postmold, PME, appears to represent a portion of the rear wall of this structure. Four additional postmolds, PMs 4, 6, 7, and 10 are randomly arranged around this structure, and do not appear to be directly associated. Bastian (1982:39) suggested that this structure might be some kind of animal pen; it is also possible that it was intended to provide shelter for soldiers on duty in the northwest bastion. While artifacts recovered from this structure do not indicate its function, they do support a construction date contemporary with the fort itself.

The Semi-Subterranean Soldier's Hut: This feature was identified just outside the entrance to the fort at its southeast corner. Backhoe stripping in this area had anticipated the identification of a fourth bastion, similar to those observed on the fort's other corners. Hence the backhoe excavations continued removing a dark soil similar in appearance to the plowzone of the site, even as this soil continued below the subsoil grade. These excavations revealed a shallow, trough-like feature, which had been partially removed during the backhoe excavations. Once recognized, machine excavations ceased, and the remainder of the feature was excavated by hand.

This feature proved to be roughly rectangular in plan (see Figure 75), and was a shallow, flat-bottomed basin with sloping sides, which had been excavated into the down slope of the knoll on which Fort Independence stood. Bastian (1982:60-61) interpreted this feature to be a semi-subterranean soldier's hut, similar to examples documented by Calver and Bolton (1950:19-22) at a Revolutionary War period British winter encampment in Manhattan. There, a row of huts had been dug into the hillside, combining an excavated hole in the subsoil with three walls of mounded earth, with the fourth wall and roof constructed of scavenged lumber. Entrances to these huts were through the front, wooden wall, while fireplaces were built on the rear earthen wall. Fireplaces were built of stone or brick, while chimneys were made of these materials, and in some instances, of barrels plastered with clay. Niches were carved into the subsoil to serve as bunks and for the storage of various artifacts (Bastian 1982:61).

The hut at Fort Independence was probably not as elaborate as those documented by Calver and Bolton (1950). It appears to have been extremely shallow, and Bastian (1982:61) believes it was used for basic shelter and not as a habitation. No evidence of a fireplace was revealed during these excavations, although such evidence may have been destroyed during the preliminary backhoe work. The interior dimensions of the hut, as interpreted from the dimensions of the excavated basin, would have been 7' 10.75" by 7' 4.75" (2.42 X 2.26 m), which would have provided cramped shelter for two or three men (Bastian 1982:62).

Based on its location, Bastian contends that this hut was intended to provide shelter for soldiers guarding the entrance to the fort, located at the southwest corner. Similar huts were probably scattered around the perimeter of the fort, and local informants reported finding spoons, bullets, and metal gun parts in the surrounding area whenever it was plowed. Bastian (1982:62) notes that the only reference to housing at Fort Independence was a mention of "the House in the fort", which was the residence of Captain John Bowie and his wife. This reference suggests that all other housing was located outside the fort's walls. The contrast in housing is dramatic, Bowie's dwelling consisting of a reasonably commodious and well constructed building with a total floor space of approximately 1,117 square feet (Bastian 1982:138), whereas the soldiers at Fort Independence lived in damp, cold, and somewhat squalid shelters, sharing a space of approximately 60 square feet. This status contrast is underscored by a comparison of artifacts from the two loci.

Fort Independence Material Culture

Fort Independence yielded a relatively rich assemblage of frontier military and domestic material culture. These artifacts are discussed in detail by Bastian (1982:82-122) accompanied by numerous illustrations (see Figure 76), and her report should be referenced by those seeking a comprehensive description of material culture on the frontier. The following section presents this material culture in broad terms, seeking general trends which relate the material culture of Fort Independence to the material culture recovered elsewhere. Specifically, three aspects of material culture are examined in depth: subsistence, pattern, and architecture.

Subsistence at Fort Independence: A limited amount of data was produced from the excavations at Fort Independence which illuminates the diet of soldiers on the Revolutionary War's southern frontier. Faunal material recovered from the homesite included cow, pig, deer, rabbit, chicken, turkey, box turtle, and snake remains. The latter two were most likely not part of the dietary fabric at Fort Independence. A limited quantity of faunal material was also recovered from the excavation of the semi-subterranean soldier's hut. Here, cow, pig, chicken, and possible deer remains were found. The types of fauna represented indicated that there was little variation in the meats used by the soldiers and their officers. The faunal assemblage of the homesite was slightly more diversified, and was far more numerous than the assemblage recovered from the semi-subterranean soldier's hut. However, the latter may represent only a single meal, while the material accumulated in the cellar of the homesite could have developed over a much greater length of time (Bastian 1982:123).

No evidence was recovered to indicate a difference in the cuts of meat preferred or allocated to soldiers and officers. In fact, few meat cuts were identified within the faunal assemblage. This maybe a product of the use of salted meat at Fort Independence and other Revolutionary War era fortifications. For example, at Fort Ligonier, Pennsylvania, a British encampment of the French and Indian



I. Lead glazed coarse earthenware storage jar.



II. Lead shot and musket hardware.



III. Earthenware porringer.



IV. A - Eighteenth century food chopper, B - Forks.



V. Ceramics. A - Chinese porcelain, B - Saltglazed stoneware, C - Jackfield ware, D - Earthenware.

Source: Bastian 1983: 84, 90, 91, 109, 112.

Figure 76. Artifacts from Fort Independence.

War, salt pork and flour were the staples of the military diet. Guilday (1977:123) contends that salt pork would leave little in the way of archaeological data, since the identifiable faunal elements, the bones, were removed from the meat prior to salting. While salted meat was the staple of some military encampments, it was used as an emergency provision at others, as demonstrated by the faunal analysis and documentary account of Fort Loudon in east Tennessee. Also a British encampment of the French and Indian War, Fort Loudon was attacked and under siege by the Cherokee Indians during the latter months of 1761. At the beginning of the siege the garrison killed all of its cattle, and barreled the beef in brine. This strategy was apparently a calculated attempt to make this meat last longer, as well as reduce the population pressure within the fortification, which would have been significant had a herd of cattle been sheltered as well as the troops. Faunal material recovered from the excavation of Fort Loudon indicate that the butchering took place within the fort, and that there was no uniformity in size or preference for particular meat cuts revealed from the faunal analysis (Bastian 1982:124).

A similar butchering strategy may have occurred at Fort Independence. Fort Independence was supplied with both live cattle and salted beef from Ninety Six. Cattle were mentioned twice in the Bowie Papers, while salted beef was mentioned four times. References to salted beef indicate that the daily ration at Fort Independence was one pound of salt beef and one and one half pounds of flour per man. One reference to cattle regarded preparations for a possible Creek Indian attack, and suggested Captain Bowie stock up on flour, salt, and cattle "in case of the worse" (Bastian 1982:124; *Bowie Papers*, Document 38). This reference implies that the beef was to be salted if a siege was imminent. References to salt beef in the *Bowie Papers*, as well as contemporary comments from an officer at Fort Ligonier (Guilday 1977:123), indicate that fresh meat was preferred, but that salted beef was a necessity in certain times, during hostilities, and also during winter and other cattle shortages. This interpretation, that salted beef was least preferred, is supported by a reference in the Bowie Papers which indicates which of several barrels of beef was the "last salted," and hence the least salty in flavor (Bastian 1982:125). It is interesting to note that the wild game recovered in the faunal assemblage: deer, rabbit, and turkey, probably served to augment the diet, especially in times when fresh beef was scarce. In this regard the quantity of wild game associated with the homesite, in comparison to the amount recovered from the semi-subterranean soldier's hut, may be indicative of the higher status of Captain Bowie.

Botanical remains recovered from several excavations at Fort Independence provide a glimpse at the plant materials consumed at the site. Peaches, black walnuts, persimmons, acorns, grapes, and grains: wheat, oats, barley, and corn, were all part of this repertoire. These items were all recovered in limited quantities, and there is no evidence that any were grown on the site. As with the faunal materials, they suggest the bland diet common to the fort was enhanced by wild resources: acorns, walnuts, persimmons, etc.

Artifact Patterning The concept of artifact patterning in historical archaeology is one first applied by Stanley South (1977). As used here, the term refers both to South's "artifact patterns," in particular the Carolina and Frontier Artifact Patterns, and also to the general distribution and arrangement of the historic artifacts recovered from Fort Independence.

South (1977) suggested that the artifacts recovered from historic site excavations could be arranged by functional groups, and that the distribution of the total assemblage among these groups would in turn reflect aspects of the cultural identity of a particular site. South identified eight functional groups: kitchen, architecture, furniture, arms, clothing, personal, tobacco, and activities, which comprised the major behavioral arenas of the Colonial world. By classifying and quantifying the percentage distribution of artifacts in each of these categories, it would be possible to produce a profile of a particular site type, which in turn could reveal cultural variation. Specifically, South (1977) noted that British American sites of the colonial period located near developed population centers exhibited a distinctly different artifact pattern than sites situated on the frontier. South (1977) designated these two patterns the Carolina and Frontier Artifact Patterns respectively.

Comparison of the artifact pattern recovered from Fort Independence with these patterns indicates that Fort Independence was most similar to the Frontier Pattern, as would be expected. Table 7 presents the artifact pattern from Fort Independence, as well as the Carolina and Frontier Artifact Patterns.

Table 7: Comparison of Frontier and Carolina Artifact patterns with Fort Independence Artifact patterns (from Bastian 1982:135).

ARTIFACT GROUP	CAROLINA PATTERN		FRONTIER PATTERN		FT. INDEPENDENCE PATTERNS	
	Mean %	% Range	Mean %	% Range	Homesite %	Site %
Kitchen	63.1	51.8-69.2	27.6	22.7-34.5	30.06	28.44
Architecture	25.5	19.7-31.4	52.0	43.0-57.5	68.07	69.62
Furniture	0.2	0.1-0.6	0.2	0.1-0.3	0.02	0.03
Arms	0.5	0.1-1.2	5.4	1.4-3.8	0.59	0.67
Clothing	3.0	0.6-5.4	1.7	0.3-3.8	0.4	0.4
Personal	0.2	0.1-0.5	0.2	0.1-0.4	0.18	0.16
Tobacco	5.8	1.8-13.9	9.1	1.9-14.0	0.37	0.38
Activities	1.7	0.9-2.7	3.7	0.7-6.4	0.31*	0.27*

* The Ethnobotanical class, made up mostly of 1000+ cereal grains, greatly inflated the Activities Group, and was deleted from the total.

As can be seen in Table 7, Fort Independence most closely resembles the Frontier Pattern, although variations exist in several important aspects. While the Kitchen Group percentage is easily within the range established for the Frontier Pattern, the Architecture Group percentage is significantly greater than the upper end of the predicted range. The Arms Group is less evident than anticipated for a military site, and more closely resembles the Carolina Pattern percentage than the Frontier Pattern. As Bastian (1982:136) notes, South (1977:154) observed that Revolutionary War era military sites often resembled domestic sites in the percentage of Arms Group artifacts recovered, while military sites of the French and Indian War exhibited far greater quantities of Arms materials. While South did not speculate on the reason for this variation, it perhaps reflects a higher degree of curation of arms related artifacts by American troops during the Revolutionary War, whose existence was more threatened and supplies less available than their British counterparts of the French and Indian War.

Bastian (1982:135) separated the artifact pattern revealed at the homesite from the overall pattern of Fort Independence. In doing so, she speculated that this pattern might more closely resemble the Carolina Artifact Pattern since it was associated with a domestic occupation. However, both the homesite pattern and the overall pattern are more indicative of South's frontier model.

In general, the pattern produced by Fort Independence reflects a more restricted range of material culture than observed for either the Carolina or Frontier Patterns. Kitchen and Architecture contributed 98.06 percent of the total artifacts recovered from Fort Independence, while these groups yielded 88.60 and 79.60 percent of the Carolina and Frontier Patterns respectively. This relative paucity of non-utilitarian artifacts is most likely a product of the meager existence of soldiers on the Revolutionary War's frontier, as well as the relatively short occupation of Fort Independence as a military outpost. Bastian (1982:138-139) speculates that the length of this occupation may be a factor in the high ratio of architectural to kitchen-related artifacts observed at Fort Independence. She views the architectural assemblage as somewhat constant, composed of the number of nails and other hardware elements required to initially construct a building. The quantity of kitchen materials, however, should increase over time, as more plates are broken, bottles disposed of, etc. Thus Bastian (1982:139) suggests "that the placement of any site along South's Frontier-Carolina continuum (1977:147) is merely a function of the length of occupation."

South's patterns were subsequently revised by Garrow (1982:52-67) to account for the place of Colono-wares on historic sites, and to remove sites with inadequate, or questionable, samples. Colono-wares had originally been identified by Ivor Nöel Hume (1962), who suggested they were an aboriginal ceramic type found on colonial historic sites as residue of Anglo-American and Indian trading. In gauging the placement of various artifact types within his functional groups, South (1977:97) argued that "Colono-Indian pottery... might functionally be included under the *Kitchen* group, but is kept under *Activities* due to the expected variability of this class of artifact, and its role in indicating Indian contact" (Italics in the original). However, subsequent research by Leland Ferguson (1978) determined that at least some of these wares were produced by Afro-American slaves. Thus, Garrow (1982:57-58) argued that these ceramics should be included in the Kitchen group calculation, as they reflected utilitarian wares used either by impoverished individuals, or by persons whose contact with Anglo-American trade networks (such as those living on the frontier) was limited. Garrow also deleted several sites from South's (1977) Carolina and Frontier patterns, on the basis of insufficient sampling and estimated artifact quantities. His revised artifact patterns are presented in Table 8 below.

Table 8: Revised Carolina and Public Interaction Patterns*
(from Garrow 1982:58, 61).

ARTIFACT GROUP	REVISED CAROLINA ARTIFACT PATTERN		PUBLIC INTERACTION ARTIFACT PATTERN	
	Mean %	% Range	Mean %	% Range
Kitchen	59.51	51.80-64.97	40.7	35.50-40.70
Architecture	27.58	25.18-31.38	42.40	41.60-43.00
Furniture	0.35	0.18-0.63	0.6	0.1-1.3
Arms	0.19	0.09-0.34	5.0	1.4-8.4
Clothing	2.94	0.55-5.38	0.9	0.3-1.6
Personal	0.29	0.19-0.54	0.1	0-0.1
Tobacco	7.85	1.91-13.94	7.9	1.3-14.0
Activities	1.29	0.94-1.71	2.4	0.5-5.4

* Garrow (1982) referred to the revised Frontier Pattern as the Public Interaction Pattern, as he felt the latter was a more correct interpretation of these sites' functions.

The Fort Independence assemblage is not in agreement with either of the revised patterns. It should be noted that no Colono-Indian ceramics were recovered at Fort Independence, and so no adjustments are required for the Fort Independence artifact pattern as presented by Bastian (1982:135). The reasons why Fort Independence varies from the Revised Frontier Artifact Pattern are several. First, the time factor noted by Bastion may be responsible for the limited quantity of Kitchen artifacts, and thus the inflated ratio of architectural to kitchen-related materials. According to Bastian's hypothesis, the artifact pattern of Fort Independence would have approached the Revised Frontier Pattern had it been occupied over a greater length of time.

A second factor may have to do with Fort Independence's place in the frontier universe. Fort Independence was constructed as a military garrison at a time of conflict with the Indian population. Thus trade with the Indians would not be expected, and it should be noted that no Colono-Indian or Cherokee ceramics were recovered from Fort Independence's historic components. The ceramic assemblage at Fort Independence was thus limited to those items received as part of the provisions sent over from Ninety Six, and to personal belongings brought to the garrison, as well as some possible items owned by Robert Anderson which were left at Fort Independence when the war began. Thus, two types of military occupations should be anticipated for the frontier: those established in peacetime, which served as distribution and trade centers as well as providing a protective presence for European settlement; and those established during periods of war.

For the former, a degree of cultural interaction and exchange should be anticipated, as the military occupants could augment their meager belongings with goods acquired from the Indians which filled basic needs, most likely cooking vessels. Because they were established in less turbulent times, these fortifications may also have enjoyed more stable supply lines and a less rationed material universe for supply, and hence the overall material wealth of such sites is anticipated to be greater than sites established and manned during a period of hostilities. Sites occupied during periods of hostilities would primarily depend on supply lines and European or American goods for provisioning, and these items were probably less numerous or available than during peacetime. Hence, such sites would be anticipated to have a lower quantity of kitchen-related artifacts, and an overall lesser degree of non-kitchen and architectural materials within their artifact patterns.

In order to test these assumptions, the artifact pattern produced from Fort Independence was compared with a military site occupied under similar conditions, Fort Ligonier. Fort Ligonier was a British occupied military fortification of the French and Indian War, whose occupation spanned the period of 1758 to 1766 (Grimm 1970). With the exception of its final years, the fort was thus occupied for the duration of that conflict. The artifact pattern from Fort Ligonier and the pattern from Fort Independence are compared below.

Table 9: A comparison of the artifact patterns from Fort Ligonier and Fort Independence

ARTIFACT GROUP	FORT LIGONIER ARTIFACT PATTERN*	FORT INDEPENDENCE ARTIFACT PATTERN
	Mean %	Mean %
Kitchen	25.60	28.44
Architecture	55.60	69.62
Furniture	0.20	0.03
Arms	5.40	0.67
Clothing	3.80	0.40
Personal	0.40	0.40
Tobacco	1.90	0.38
Activities	4.10	0.27

* From South (1977:145)

The two sites are remarkably similar. Fort Ligonier possesses a greater quantity of arms-related artifacts than Fort Independence, a difference which South noted as existing between sites of the French and Indian War and those of the Revolution, and a slightly more diverse material assemblage than Fort Independence, but overall the sites are comparable and distinct from the revised Carolina and Frontier Artifact Patterns. Thus it appears that this aspect of frontier existence: trade relations with the aboriginal population, should be considered when formulating artifact patterns, and in the general explanation of frontier material culture.

An additional measure of the imprint of wartime activities on the material world is suggested through the calculation of South's (1977:210-17) Mean Ceramic Date Formula (MCD). The MCD uses the known production span for a variety of historic ceramics of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries; calculates the mean date for each type within this span; multiplies this number by the total number of sherds of the particular type; and finally divides the sum of all such calculations by the total number of sherds included in the calculation, to produce a mean production date for the entire assemblage. The mean date calculated in this manner for Fort Independence was 1747. This date is clearly earlier than the documented mean occupation of the site, which, assuming the earliest possible occupation date to be 1763, would be 1771. If the site was first occupied in 1774, then the mean occupation date would be 1776.5. Either date is nearly three decades later than the MCD would suggest. Adams and Gaw (1977) conducted a study of ceramic time lag from materials recovered at the late nineteenth-century town of Silcott, Washington, and observed a time lag of 21 to 23.5 years when the age of ceramics were compared with bottle glass from the same context (Bastian 1982:140; Adams and Gaw 1977:228). Adams and Gaw (1977:218) divided time lag into two components: manufacture and retail time lag (including transit, storage and sale), and use time lag (including purchase, use, and discard). The retail component of time lag was presumed to be of a shorter duration than the use component.

However, Bastian (1982:141) suggests that the time lag revealed at Fort Independence is neither a factor of retail or use. Rather, she contends that this temporal variation is a product of the wartime environment and disruptions in established or traditional trade networks. Concerning the effects of the war, she writes (Bastian 1982:141):

> during the Revolutionary War, the newest British ceramics weren't being imported and the newest French or other European ceramics were being restricted in their importation by blockades. Consequently, the inhabitants of Fort Independence made do with their old ceramics, resulting in an earlier mean ceramic date than had the site been occupied just a decade later.

The image that emerges of Fort Independence through examination of the archaeological record is one of a frugal existence. The soldiers, and even their officers, appear to have come to this isolated frontier outpost with few personal possessions. Their supply line from Ninety Six furnished the bare necessities, but little in the way of luxury. Meals were simple, spartan, and perhaps sometimes less than palatable. They were prepared in crude coarse earthenware pots, and eaten from wooden trenchers, pewter plates, and delft, a ceramic more familiar to the previous century than to the early industrial era. As they were in conflict with the local native population, this existence could not be augmented with Indian ceramics. Only nature offered a slight respite from this monotony, an occasional deer, rabbit or turkey to break the dependence on salted beef. The inhabitants of Fort Independence occupied a frontier in conflict, a frontier which was different than that of a more peaceful time.

Architecture (Figure 77) The structure and construction of the architecture at Fort Independence were discussed above under a separate heading. This section serves to compare this architecture with other domestic and military occupations, to determine how and to what degree the frontier of South Carolina was integrated with broader cultural patterns.

The homesite at Fort Independence was similar in most regards to other Colonial housing constructed by individuals of modest means, although it did exhibit certain idiosyncrasies. In plan, the structure was probably either a one room or a hall-and parlor design. The gable end chimney, loft, and cellar are all characteristics of colonial housing in the English tradition. The interpreted use of hewn logs reflects the position of this structure on the frontier, as frame and clapboard would have been employed in urban or more developed regions. In size, (20' 6" X 26' 6") this structure was larger than the traditional rural log house dimensions of 16' X 16' (Bastian 1982:143; Swaim 1978:30), but smaller than contemporary urban structures (cf. the Hepburn-Reonalds House, 23' X 30' and Nath Moore's Front, 24' 7" X 38' 7", both in Brunswick Town, North Carolina - South 1977:51, 57; Bastian 1982:143).

The size and the sturdy foundation of this structure indicate it was not built as a temporary dwelling to be replaced by a better home once circumstances permitted. The construction also suggests an interesting balancing of needs and means. As noted above, this house was larger than most contemporary single-chimneyed rural homesteads, but smaller than urban homes which were built with two chimneys. The traditional rural homestead size of 16' X 16' is thought to be a product of the amount of space which could be heated by a single fireplace. At the Fort Independence homesite, the fireplace was larger than usual, and would have projected well into the interior of the house. The increased span of the fireplace hearth perhaps reflects an attempt to heat a larger than normal rural home with a single fireplace. The articulation of the fireplace chimney with the exterior walls is also at odds with traditional architecture. While the gable-end chimney is common for most colonial housing, in New England the chimney was enclosed by the exterior wall, while in the southern colonies it was most frequently built on the exterior. The northern use of an enclosed chimney was a product of a severe climate and the absence of adequate supplies of lime for mortar. Thus chimneys were enclosed to protect them from the elements and to provide greater heat to the interior. At Fort Independence three sides of the chimney were enclosed, with the rear facade the only exposed surface. This compromise probably served to protect the chimney from the elements (Bastian 1982:144), since the single exposed side could have been shielded by a projecting eave, and also provided greater heat to the interior, since the warm air traveling through the chimney heated the interior of the structure. This would have offered an advantage in the winter, but a disadvantage in the summer, when the fireplace, in use for cooking, would have more thoroughly heated an already tepid environment. Again, this construction reflects a compromise between needs and means. While twin gable chimneys would have best suited the Fort Independence


FORT INDEPENDENCE
38 AB 218
CONJECTURAL RECONSTRUCTION BASED ON ARCHAEOLOGICAL FINDINGS AND PERIOD ARCHITECTURE

Source: Bastian 1982:69.

Figure 77. Conjectural View of Fort Independence.

homestead, the cost of constructing a second chimney was apparently greater than its builder could afford.

The second domestic structure at Fort Independence, the semi-subterranean soldier's hut, represents the continuation of a concept developed during the early period of colonial settlement. Contemporary accounts of the first settlers in the Massachusetts Bay area reported they (Kimball 1966:50, as cited in Bastian 1982:145):

> burrow themselves in the Earth for their first shelter under some Hill side, casting the Earth aloft upon Timber; they make a smoaky fire against the Earth at its highest side.

A similar construction was noted among the first settlers of Philadelphia, Kimball (1966:50, as cited in Bastian 1982:145) noted that the earliest shelters established in that city in 1682:

> were formed by digging into the ground, near the verge of the river-front bank, about three feet in depth; thus making half their chamber underground, and the remaining half above ground was formed of sods of earth, or earth and brush combined. The roofs were formed of layers of limbs, or split pieces of trees overlaid with sod or bark, river rushes, etc.

This semi-subterranean construction was used in most instances as temporary shelter, and was not likely to survive for any great length of time. As Bastian (1982:145) points out, the recognition of this architectural form in the archaeological record is difficult, since once abandoned, the basin remnants of these structures probably served as refuse pits, and hence might not be recognized as architectural remains. This construction was most frequently associated with military encampments following the seventeenth century, and was found at the French and Indian War encampment of Fort Loudon, where the men involved in the construction of the fort lived for several months until more permanent housing could be constructed, and at the British winter encampment in Manhattan during the Revolutionary War (Calver and Bolton 1950). The adaptability of these structures was not lost on the military strategists of the American Civil War era (Bastian 1982:145; Scott 1861:140-141). It is interesting to note that, even in the military context, such housing was usually considered temporary. Perhaps the scale of Fort Independence and the inadequate space for permanent barracks within the stockade influenced the decision to relocate and reconstruct the fortification after only slightly more than a year's occupancy.

The fortification itself, as noted, varied considerably from other contemporary fortifications. The plan of the fortification, "a regular polygon with bastions at the projecting angles (except for one)" (Bastian 1982:145-146) follows traditional military architecture, but otherwise the construction is relatively rare, and more in common with seventeenth-century holeset-post domestic architecture (Carson et al. 1981) than Revolutionary War military architecture. The construction of

Fort Independence was perhaps better suited to Indian warfare than to the European style of engagements, since the Indians were more inclined to guerilla tactics than to sieges. Thus the illusion of a palisade was most likely sufficient to deter Indian attacks (Bastian 1982:146). With the addition of the British as antagonists in 1776, Fort Independence's construction was less suited to the war being waged, and a rebuilding became imperative.

The combination of evidence supports the interpretation that Fort Independence was originally constructed as a fortified homestead in 1774, with a limited amount of repairs done in 1776 as its status was upgraded to Revolutionary War fortification. The locations and designs of the other Savannah River forts of 1774 are unknown, although presumably they followed a plan similar to that of Fort Independence. The concept of the fortified homestead is one which has a substantial history in English settlement. Consideration of the form and construction of other sites indicates that there was no common plan or architectural requirements, and that a variety of forms which filled the basic prerequisites were used. Two factors appear to be the catalysts for fortified homestead construction: (1) the threat of attack by hostile forces on isolated and outnumbered intrusive settlers, and (2) the necessity of creating some common ground for mutual defense (Bastian 1982:146-147).

Such fortified homesteads were built by English colonists in northern Ireland in the early seventeenth century, where they were known as "bawns." In northern Ireland, the homestead chosen for fortification was usually that of one of the leaders of the group, presumably someone who could muster the support of enough individuals to construct the fortification (Bastian 1982:147; Nöel Hume 1979:765, 767; 1982). A contemporary plan for one of these bawns (Bastian 1982:147; Garvan 1951:127) shows it as having earthen walls approximately 90 feet on a side, four bastions, and a surrounding ditch with drawbridge entrance. The homesite was built into the rear wall of the fortification, leaving a large protected courtyard. This plan is more elaborate than most fortified homesteads, and is closer to a reduced version of a true fortification. However,for the British in northern Ireland, the cessation of hostilities was not readily evident, and the fortifications were built with endurance in mind (Bastian 1982:147).

Similar, although less elaborate, fortifications were built in colonial North America from the earliest period of settlement. At Martin's Hundred in Virginia, a four sided trapezoidal palisade surrounded a central homestead dating to the period of 1619 to 1622. The construction of the palisade was similar to that of Fort Independence, with posts set out on nine foot spacings in a design Ivor Nöel Hume described as "laid out by someone trained in the 'why don't we stop about here' school of military engineering" (Nöel Hume 1979:762; Bastian 1982:147). Later in the seventeenth century, the "Clifts" house at Stratford Plantation was built behind a rectangular palisade, at a time (ca. 1670) when fear of an Indian uprising was spreading through the colony (Nieman 1980:20). Bastian (1982:148) views this fortification as of "more psychological than defensive value."

The fortified homestead concept appears to have followed the American frontier in its westward expansion. For example, Fort Buenaventura was a mid-nineteenth century fortified homestead built by Connecticut immigrant Miles Goodyear. Archaeological investigations indicate the fortification measured some 55' X 60', and was anchored with hole-set posts similar to the construction of Fort Independence. The fort apparently did not have bastions, but cabins were located in each of the four corners (Bastian 1982:149-150; DeBloois 1979, 1980); an interesting observation considering the structure tucked inside Fort Independence's northwest corner.

An ancillary of the walled fortified homestead was the "garrison house" found in mid-seventeenth-century New England. Here, defense was provided through an exceptionally sturdy, thick-walled domestic structure. Windows in this structure were narrow slits which were commonly barred, while doors were heavy enough to resist battering. The "garrison house" derived from the log-constructed "castles" built by the Norman conquerors, and were the only type of log construction the English brought to the New World. Like the "bawns" they were commonly the homes of prominent community leaders, and gathering points in times of conflict (Bastian 1982:147; Foley 1980:54).

Given this consideration of other fortified homesteads, a greater appreciation can be given to Fort Independence. With the exception of the massive "bawns" of northern Ireland, Fort Independence's protective sheathing was actually quite elaborate. Of the other sites mentioned above, Martin's Hundred featured only a watch tower and gun platform extending from two corners of the fort, so that the two other corners were not treated defensively (Nöel Hume 1979:739; 1982), the "Clifts" also featured semi-circular bastions on only two corners (Nieman 1980:19), while no bastions guarded Fort Buenaventura (DeBloois 1979:2-15). Thus Fort Independence's three-bastioned construction afforded considerable protection. The size of the fort, 76' X 76' along the curtain walls, also compares favorably with other fortified homesteads. The stockade at Martin's Hundred measured roughly 70' X 110' (Nöel Hume 1979:739), and that at the "Clifts" 55' X 60', dimensions shared by Fort Buenaventura (DeBloois 1979, 1980). With the exception of Martin's Hundred, Fort Independence offered the largest protected enclosure.

Finally, although it is impossible to say from the archaeological evidence, the homesite at Fort Independence may have shared characteristics of the New England "garrison house." Certainly the foundations would have supported massive walls, which were probably constructed of hewn logs. It is impossible to determine the size or shape of this structure's windows, but a heavy log structure in the middle of a fortified compound would have offered a final source of refuge if the stockade were breached.

Although little is known of him, Robert Anderson appears to fit the description ascribed to other builders of fortified homesteads, that of a military leader on the frontier. His military genius was recognized and appreciated by the Continental Army, his courage and leadership abilities witnessed in his harassment of Boyd's troops while severely outnumbered. Thus, the combination of man and fortification meshes well with the historic perception of the fortified homestead.

Fort Independence must be understood as it was built, and not in its final role. As a fortified homestead on an isolated frontier, Fort Independence was probably well suited to discourage Indian raids, and to provide refuge when discouragement was not enough. As a protective enclosure for a small number of settlers and their families, Fort Independence provided more than adequate space and protection. As a Revolutionary War fort threatened by siege, and home to 40 to 60 men, Fort Independence must have seemed cramped, fragile, and vulnerable. The fortified frontier homestead was not well suited to the hostilities of European war.

Conclusions

Fort Independence does not articulate well with models of frontier existence, as presented in either the historical or archaeological literature. Waselkov and Paul (1981) and Lewis (1976) have both proposed models of the frontier, which contend that as new cultural groups enter the frontier, cultural systems undergo simplification and become more self-sufficient. It is difficult to document either at Fort Independence. As Bastian notes (1982:151-152), it is difficult to measure "simplification" in the archaeological record. Certainly Fort Independence displays a more restricted material baggage, at least if artifact patterning is any indication, but these restrictions should not readily be interpreted as simplifications. Tea sets, a compass case lid, surveyor's instruments, possible medical paraphernalia, and brass furniture hardware all suggest that, rather than abandoning their cultural trappings, the occupants of Fort Independence attempted to bring specifically those items which expressed their cultural identity, items such as teaware. Limitation, but not simplification, would appear to be the result. As for self-sufficiency, Fort Independence clearly was not. Supplies from Ninety Six fed the troops, with the occasional wild game breaking the monotony but not providing any measure of real sustenance. Key to this aspect of frontier survival is Fort Independence's relation to the Indian population. With the possible exception of five glass beads, no trade items or Indian ceramics or other evidence of contact with the Indians were recovered from Fort Independence. The documentary record mentions only one point of communication with the Indians: a drummer from Fort Independence was loaned for a military escort provided to South Carolina's upcountry agent for Indian affairs on a visit to the Creeks in Georgia (Bastian 1982:151; *Bowie Papers*, Document 45). Fort Independence did not augment its material existence through trading with the native population.

This aspect perhaps best describes Fort Independence's variance from archaeological models of the frontier, such as the Public Interaction Artifact Pattern proposed by Garrow (1982). By including aboriginal and possible Afro-American ceramics in the Kitchen Group calculation, Garrow (1982) demonstrated that the Revised Frontier Pattern was not so greatly different from the Carolina Artifact pattern, or other patterns of colonial material culture, and that European ceramics were augmented by aboriginal wares in the frontier setting. The evidence from Fort Independence and Fort Ligonier suggests that perhaps there are two frontier patterns: one for the "passive" frontier where cultural exchange exists between native and European cultures, a second for the "active" frontier where these cultures are in conflict. Thus the frontier itself must be understood as a varying cultural phenomenon. During initial exploration and settlement, the invading culture would not necessarily be a threat to the native population. An interchange of goods would be likely to occur, and the invaders would perhaps adopt some of the native culture's customs and materials as a means of survival. Such a situation certainly occurred between the Cherokee and the European settlers arriving in the upcountry, with both groups exchanging and adapting to each other's material world (Harmon 1986). As the invading population increased, it would begin to threaten the cultural system of the native culture. At this time conflict was likely to occur, the passive frontier shifting into the active mode, and exchange would no longer take place. Fort Independence is an example of the frontier in this latter state.

This overview of Fort Independence has served to develop a keener understanding of daily life in the Russell Reservoir region during the Revolutionary War. It's presence, and that of other forts and forces elsewhere in the thirteen colonies, served to secure victory for the American republic over the British. With the end of the war, settlement of the project area expanded at a much faster scale, and the region quickly passed from frontier to an agrarian culture.

THE POST REVOLUTIONARY WAR ERA IN THE RUSSELL RESERVOIR

The end of the Revolutionary War removed the Indian threat from the project area on both sides of the Savannah River, and left open broad expanses of land for settlement. Migration into the area followed several routes, none of which appear to have directly crossed the area of the RBR proper. Two major roads passed to the north and south of the area, one crossing the river at Hattons Ford, the second passing over at Petersburg, Georgia (Figure 78). The project area itself appears to have been bypassed by the primary transportation corridors for several reasons. First, it was nestled within a pocket created by steep terrain to the east of the project area and to the west of the Saluda River. Rather than crossing this terrain, transportation lines skirted it to the north and south. Second, no population centers or distribution points developed in the project area. Because it had stood on the frontier of the Indian territory, and was thus continuously threatened during the colonial period, settlement of the Russell area was sparse. With the close of the Revolution, the frontier expanded rapidly, and most settlers traveling to this frontier debarked, regrouped, and reconsidered their destinations from the developing towns in the region. Abbeville, South Carolina, east of the project area, and Petersburg, Georgia, to its south, were the major population centers at this time (The History Group 1981:75-76).


MAJOR MIGRATION PATTERN
FOR
GEORGIA
from Ninety Six, Pendleton and Greenville Districts
Clevelands Ferry
Hattons Ford
R.B.R. MRA
Lisbon or Petersburg Ferry
from Abbeville, Laurens, Union and York Districts
Barksdales Ferry
Savannah River
from central South Carolina area
from Charleston and coastal South Carolina area
Sand Bar Ferry
Upper Creek Trading Path
Lower Creek Trading Path
WHITE
BANKS
MADISON
BARROW
WALTON
OCONEE
LINCOLN
COLUMBIA
TALIAFERRO
McDUFFIE
JASPER
HANCOCK
RICHMOND
BALDWIN
BURKE
(Adapted from Hemperley 1968)

Source: The History Group 1981:77.

Figure 78. Major Migration Paths into Georgia.

A third factor was the changing perception of the frontier. This boundary was rapidly expanding in the late eighteenth century, and settlers appear to have been in constant pursuit. The frontier was viewed as offering many advantages over settled regions: fertile and inexpensive land; new commercial and industrial opportunities; and distance from developed, and for some overly populated, areas. By the 1790s the frontier was the Oconee River in Georgia, and not the Savannah, and thus many settlers focused on this as their destination (The History Group 1981:76).

Despite this "leapfrogging" effect of settlement following an expanding frontier, the Russell Reservoir did receive a dramatic population increase in the period following the Revolutionary War. These settlers came from a variety of ethnic backgrounds, with persons of English, Scots-Irish, and Scottish descent predominating. German and Dutch settlers were also present, and a group of French Huguenots had migrated to the interior from Charleston, lending their nomenclature to land: New Rochelle, New Bordeaux, and Abbeville, named for Abbeville, France. These immigrants frequently arrived as extended families, choosing and settling land in proximity to one another. It is possible to get a sense of this kin-based network of settlement from a special census of Elbert County compiled in 1790. Between the Broad River and Beaverdam Creek, the Burtons (Cogbill, Henry, Robert, and Thomas), the Colemans (John and James), and the Hudsons (Drury, Farley, John, Robert, William Jr. and William Sr.) were the main families. The Clevelands, Colberts, Cooks, Thortons, and Whites occupied the regions between Coldwater Creek and Beaverdam Creek, while above Coldwater Creek the Cunninghams, Davises, Rileys, and Teasleys held sway. Settlement was also dictated by ethnic ties: the McDonalds, McDougals, McEwins, McGareys, McGoverns, McGuires, and McKenzies formed a Scots contingent located above Coldwater Creek, near the community of Edinburg. Settlers appear to have ameliorated the journey into unfamiliar lands by traveling with kin and countrymen (The History Group 1981:78-79).

In a study conducted for the War Eagle Creek Region of Madison County, Arkansas, Joyce (1981) determined that kinship was perhaps the most critical factor in determining settlement location and preference. Considering a variety of environmental variables: distance to water, soil quality, vegetation, etc. in conjunction with cultural aspects: distance to nearest community, distance to roads, kinship, etc., she determined that settlers were willing to accept inferior land if it placed them in relatively close proximity to kin. Such settlement patterning also appears to have existed in the Russell Reservoir, and should be considered by archaeologists, who traditionally formulate settlement models on the basis of environmental determinants.

Familial ties were extended and expanded as the settlement of the Russell Reservoir area progressed. Often a family member, or several family members, acted as scouts to determine the quality of the new lands. They reported back, and if satisfied, other family members joined them in the new territory. The knowledge and perception of the frontier was often dependent on having sources in the region, and this factor also applies to the kin and ethnic settlement connections (The History Group 1981:79).

The settlers of the Russell Reservoir were by no means settled. For many, the region represented only another stop on a continuing quest for the holy grail of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: the frontier. This constant migration was spurred by the availability of inexpensive lands on the frontier, rumors of its fertility, and the destruction and erosion of the agricultural fields in the project area, and would continue throughout the nineteenth century (The History Group 1981:80). Even successful planters like James Henry Hammond, who owned Silver Bluff Plantation in the area of Augusta, were constantly vexed and drawn by the allure of westward lands. Hammond wrote: "I have been trying to get over my desire for a western plantation, but every time I see a man who has been there it puts me in a fever" (in Faust 1982:109). For smaller farmers, occupying less fertile lands from the onset, the attraction of the frontier was even greater. With the advent of the cotton era, the frontier offered social mobility, a chance for small farmers to join the plantation aristocracy.

In the Piedmont it was erosion, more than depleted soil fertility, that spurred immigration, and erosion occurred at an earlier point in time than in areas of less relief. Geographer Stanley Trimble has referred to the mid-Georgia Piedmont as an "erosional tinderbox" (The History Group 1981:80; Trimble 1974), and soils geologist Arthur Hall has noted that the effects of erosion were likely to occur soon after a tract had been settled and prepared for agriculture (in Hall 1940:2; The History Group 1981:81):

> The upland areas generally begin to show effects of washing as soon as the forest litter, roots, and stumps had had time to decay, that is, the second or third year after clearing.

Erosion was effected by the agricultural practices of the time. Much of the Russell Reservoir area was densely forested at the time of historic settlement. The forest canopy shielded the land from rain, while root systems and ground cover helped to hold this soil together. Such forests were ill-suited to agriculture, however, and the settlers arriving in the backcountry first needed to clear their land of trees and stumps, and prepare it for plowing. Thus the canopy was removed, the consolidating effect of the root mat and overburden was lost, and the soils themselves loosened through plowing. In the sloping uplands, these fields enjoyed little protection from erosion.

The best successes were realized on the bottom lands, where the soil was exceptionally fertile. John Drayton wrote in 1802 that the fertility of these lands was so great that (Drayton 1973:22; in Taylor and Smith 1978:122):

> all the art of manuring, and rotation of crops, have hitherto been little attended to; and when one piece of land has been exhausted by culture, another has been cleared of woods, for similar purposes.

This fertility did not extend to all lands in the project area. F. A. Michaux, who also visited the area in 1802, noted (Michaux 1974:42; in Brooks 1978:122):

> Those that occupy the intermediate spaces [the uplands] are much less so [fertile]. The latter are not much cultivated; and even those who occupy them are obliged to be perpetually clearing them, in order to obtain more abundant harvests; in consequence of which a great number of the inhabitants emigrate into the western country.

Thus while the bottomlands maintained fertility and were well suited to agriculture, the uplands were quickly exhausted and abandoned. For those who had not obtained bottomlands in the Russell Reservoir area, the promise of other bottomlands to the west was catalyst enough for moving.

At the close of the eighteenth century, the Russell Reservoir was populated by a patchwork of small farms owned by an ethnically varied population. Some of these farmers were situated on the bottomlands of the Savannah and Broad rivers and their numerous tributaries, while others were perched on the sloping uplands. The latter had already witnessed severe erosion, and undoubtedly the constant toil of clearing new forest lands for cultivation forced them to consider moving westward, to new and better lands. Socially the inhabitants of the Russell Reservoir were of similar status and station, and the quality of land they owned, and amount, were perhaps the only variables which distinguished them. Bottomlands and uplands alike, they probably cultivated corn, tobacco, wheat, rye, and sweet potatoes, keeping chickens and some livestock to augment this existence. The upcountry offered survival, not great riches. It was a good home for the yeoman farmer.

Yet discoveries to the immediate south changed this existence. Eli Whitney's cotton gin, built in 1793, made cotton agriculture in the upcountry a profitable pursuit. By the first decade of the nineteenth century, the social scale of the upcountry was expanding. Those with access to the rich bottomlands, and who could afford slaves, could make a healthy profit. For those without, the lure of the west grew greater. To understand the Russell Reservoir after 1810, it must be considered as the land of King Cotton.